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Debate over wealth redistribution plays a prominent role in society, but the causes 
of differences in support for redistribution remain contested. A recent three-person two-
situation model suggests these differences are shaped by evolved motivational systems 
of self-interest, compassion, and dispositional envy. We conducted a close replication 
testing this prediction, all subjects were British, recruited from an online subject pool. 
Study 1 (N = 206) confirmed the roles of self-interest (𝛽 = 0.20) and compassion for 
others (𝛽 = 0.37), as well as a predicted null effect of procedural fairness. Dispositional 
envy was non-significant (𝛽 = 0.06). In study 2 (N = 304), we tested whether it was 
better to conceptualize envy as being two separate emotions, benign envy and malicious 
envy. A significant effect of malicious envy was found (𝛽 = 0.13) and no significant 
effect of benign envy (𝛽 = -0.06). Study 3 (N = 501) closely replicated this improved 
model, confirming significant effects of compassion (𝛽 = 0.40), self-interest (𝛽 = 0.21), 
and malicious envy (𝛽 = 0.15), accounting for one third of variance in support for 
redistribution. These results support the role of evolved motivational systems to explain 
and improve important aspects of contemporary economic redistribution. 
 
Keywords: redistribution, emotion, compassion, envy, self-interest 
 
  




































































 Support for redistribution of resources from the more well-off to the less well-off 
is a major focus of political disagreement. On average, people think some redistribution 
is warranted via mechanisms including taxation, welfare, housing and health provision 
and other entitlements (McCaffery & Baron, 2004). However large differences also 
exist in support for redistribution (Linos & West, 2003) and multiple psychological and 
sociological accounts have been generated to account for these differences. A common 
feature of such accounts is a focus on self-interest, the hypothesis being that those to 
whom wealth would be transferred should favour such transfers (Kangas, 1997). Self-
interest alone, however, accounts for only a minority of variance in support for 
redistribution: Less well-off people do not necessarily support redistribution, and 
better-off people often support higher taxes and social welfare which would reduce their 
own income (Klor & Shayo, 2010; Weeden & Kurzban, 2016). Explanations for 
economic and political choices have thus expanded to include factors as diverse as 
personality and intelligence (Lewis & Bates, 2011, 2018), and goals such as using 
redistribution as an insurance policy to reduce uncertainty of resource acquisition 
(Kameda, Takezawa, Tindale, & Smith, 2002). 
 
Here, we replicate and extend a recent study arguing that redistribution is shaped 
not only by mechanisms selected to pursue self-interest, but by additional systems for 
responding to others who are less well-off (experienced as compassion) and to those 
who are better-off than oneself, experienced as envy (Sznycer et al., 2017). Evidence 
for this three-player two-situation model has been found in different cultures, but not 
independently replicated. Importantly, while the effects of compassion and self-interest 
are robust, the effects of envy were less so. In this series of three studies, we focus on 
the functionalist account that the study results substantiate. We take the opportunity to 
focus on the psychological form of the adaptations sculpted by specific selection 
pressures, exploring alternative implementations of one of the motives: contrasting 
benign and malicious forms of envy to articulate and refine the motive activated in 
relations to better-off others. We begin by outlining the three-player two-situation 
model, before reporting three studies testing replication and refining this model. 
 
Three motivational systems 




































































emotional motivations of envy, compassion, and self-interest. The functionalist logic 
relating these three motivational systems to support for redistribution was developed 
by identifying three players and two situations present in the ancestral environment 
which could influence adaptations for redistribution, namely: 1: Others in the group 
who are less well-off than the self; 2: Others who are better-off than the self; and 3: The 
actor themselves. We next describe evidence for evolved motivations active in self-
interest and situational relations to the better-off and the less well-off. 
 
In developing a model of the adaptive response to those less well-off in the group, 
Sznycer et al. (2017) drew upon anthropological data showing that provision of aid to 
those in need is common (Kaplan et al., 1985). The evolutionary rationale for this 
adaptation derives from evidence our ancestors lived in a high-risk environment in 
which, consequently, the likelihood of needing help from others was high. In this 
environment an adaptation to mutualise risk can evolve, with reciprocal aid acting as a 
form of insurance policy (Aktipis et al., 2016; Cashdan, 1985; Kurzban, Burton-
Chellew, & West, 2015). Sharing a resource with needy others often has low marginal 
cost (Jaeggi & Gurven, 2013; Kaplan, Gurven, Hill, & Hurtado, 2005), but may increase 
the concern of aid recipients for the helper’s welfare, increasing the likelihood of 
support or help in the future (Tooby & Cosmides, 1996). The Sznycer et al. (2017) 
model proposes that this adaptation is experienced as compassion, with less well-off 
others eliciting compassion and more compassionate individuals showing support for 
redistribution.  
 
The second situation modelled is that between the self and those who are better-
off. Here Sznycer et al. (2017) highlight research on the role of positional goods such 
as status. Possession of positional resources places the better-off at an advantage in 
social competition and evidence suggests that less well-off individuals will work to 
reduce the position of better-off actors, even incurring costs to themselves if this results 
in a relative improvement (e.g. Pedersen, Kurzban, & McCullough, 2013; Zizzo & 
Oswald, 2001). Sznycer et al. (2017) proposed that the motivational system 
implementing this adaptation will be experienced as envy – an emotion characterised 
by hostility to those who are superior to the individual on some valued dimension 




































































to the better-off will in part be characterised by envy, and that those experiencing envy 
more readily will show greater support for redistribution, even when this will reduce 
the total wealth available for redistribution, because redistribution satisfies the envious 
motivation of reducing the competitive advantage of the better-off. 
 
The third factor in the model is self-interest. This is viewed as a system for 
computing the benefit or cost of an action for the actor him or herself. Of the three 
systems in this theory, self-interest is perhaps the most straight-forward and features in 
almost all accounts of motivational systems (Halpern, 2001; Weeden & Kurzban, 2016). 
Self-interest, as a computational system, motivates accumulating and maintaining one’s 
own resources, independent of relative wealth. Thus, self-interest is hypothesized to be 
associated with conditional support for redistribution: those less well-off will be 
motivated to support redistribution, while those who would be worse off after 
redistribution will be motivated to oppose it. 
 
The role of fairness in redistribution 
Importantly, Sznycer et al. (2017) examined an extra adaptation, that of fairness. 
While it is not an element of the three-person two-situation model, fairness is widely 
viewed as important in models of resource division (Brosnan & de Waal, 2014; Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999). Fairness is an umbrella term covering concepts as varied as egalitarian 
outcome-equality (Starmans, Sheskin, & Bloom, 2017), impartial division of benefits 
and sharing costs (Baumard, André, & Sperber, 2013) and process fairness or equal 
treatment under relevant laws or conventions (Thibaut, Walker, LaTour, & Houlden, 
1973). Sznycer et al. (2017) tested two fairness concepts commonly implicated in 
distribution experiments: windfall or distributional fairness assessed in scenario-based 
tests in which a windfall must be divided between oneself and others (Charness & Rabin, 
2002; Engelmann & Strobel, 2004) and procedural fairness assessed psychometrically 
for example asking subjects if “Every group should be judged with the same yardstick” 
(Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986; Greenberg, 1987). We next detail the results of tests of 
these motivational systems. 
  





































































Sznycer et al. (2017) applied their three-motivation model along with measures of 
fairness to measures of support for redistribution in four major studies with a total of 
over two thousand participants, and in four countries: The United States, India, the UK, 
and Israel. Following (Sznycer et al., 2017), because motivations are predicted to 
combine additively to produce a given individual’s support for redistribution, each of 
the main analyses included all of the motives rather than testing these individually. 
 
The details of their findings from these four major experiments testing the role of 
motivations in support for redistribution are shown in Table 1. In all four countries, 
reliable, highly significant, medium to large effects were found for both compassion 
(standardized effect sizes 0.25 to 0.40) and for self-interest (effects 0.18 to 0.30). For 
envy, effects were much smaller (𝛽s 0.08 to 0.14) and failed to reach significance in 
one of their four studies. In terms of the three motivations implicated in the three-player 
two-situation model, then, these studies provided strong support for two of the 
motivations, and significant but perhaps less compelling support for envy. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Evidence for effects of the two forms of fairness tested was much weaker. 
Distributional fairness was assessed in a total of 9 studies with most of these failing to 
show a role for this form of fairness. Importantly, in no case did distributional fairness 
generate incremental prediction over and above measures of compassion, envy and self-
interest measures. Windfall or distributional fairness, then, appears at best to function 
as a weak proxy for effects already captured by compassion, envy, and self-interest. 
Association of procedural fairness was tested in four studies, with only one significant 
relationship emerging, and estimates ranging from -0.08 to 0.22. This lack of effect of 
fairness as 'striking' (Sznycer et al., 2017), and we therefore wished to follow-up, with 
additional tests of the effect of procedural fairness. 
 
 
In summary, Sznycer et al. (2017) found surprizing evidence that evolved 
mechanisms underpinning compassion, envy, and self-interest influence important 




































































effect sizes for these motivations differed substantially, with envy showing a much 
smaller effect and compassion a very strong effect and procedural fairness no effect. 
An important first step to progressing this area, then, would be an independent 
confirmation of these important roles for self-interest, compassion, clarity over the role 
of dispositional envy, as well as additional evidence regarding the surprizing lack of 
effect of procedural fairness. In order to gain this information, we conducted a close 
replication of Sznycer et al. (2017) presented here as study 1. 
Materials, data, and all analysis scripts for this and all other studies are provided 




In study 1, we conducted a close replication of Sznycer et al. (2017) with the same 
measures and control variables including age, gender, SES and political orientation. 
We pre-registered 7 predictions for this replication using the exact same statistical 
procedures and scales used by Sznycer et al. (2017). We pre-registered 7 predictions 
as follows (url: https://aspredicted.org/dx8my.pdf): 
(1) Higher compassion will be associated with higher support for redistribution.  
(2) Higher envy will be associated with higher support for redistribution. 
(3) Higher self-interest will be associated with higher support for redistribution. 
(4) Preference for fairness will not be associated with support for redistribution. 
(5) Left-political support will be associated with higher support for redistribution.  
(6) Higher compassion will be associated with higher reported aid to the poor. 
(7) Envy will be associated with wealthy-harming tax choices. 
 
As done by Sznycer et al. (2017), compassion, envy, self-interest and fairness were 
entered jointly in each analysis. Measurement of support for redistribution, compassion, 
envy, self-interest, aid to the poor and wealthy-harming tax choices were each as 
described in Sznycer et al. (2017). Likewise, socioeconomic status (SES) was 
controlled. Based on previous work showing that party affiliation was a strong influence 
self-reported preferences for redistribution (Sears, Lau, Tyler, & Allen, 1980), in their 
US study Sznycer et al. (2017) controlled for party affiliation. It is unclear whether 




































































motives and other beliefs impacting support for redistribution. For this reason, in our 
analyses, we assessed political alignment, but report analyses both with and without 
this covariate. Finally, to ensure our study was a close replication of the original study, 
preference for procedural fairness was administered after the participant had finished 




A total of 215 UK participants were recruited using Prolific Academic. We pre-
registered a criterion that subjects who completed the questionnaire less than 15 
minutes would be excluded. Nine subjects met this criterion, and we present the results 
excluding these subjects. Including them did not alter the results. Of the 206 UK 
subjects included in analyses 136 were female, 4 of unknown gender. Mean age was 34 
years (SD = 13). The sample included participants identifying themselves as White (n 
= 186; 90.3%), Asian (n = 7; 3.4%), Mixed (n = 5; 2.4%), Black (n = 4; 1.9%) and other 
(n = 4; 1.9%). The study procedures were approved by the Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee at the School of Philosophy, Psychology & Language Sciences in the 
University of Edinburgh, and participants gave informed consent. 
 
Measures 
Attitudes toward redistribution were measured with the 11-item support for 
economic redistribution scale based on Petersen, Sznycer, Sell, Cosmides, and Tooby 
(2013) as modified by Sznycer et al. (2017), Example items include: “The government 
should increase taxes to give more help to the poor” and “It is not fair that people have 
to pay taxes to fund welfare programs” (reversed). Each item used a Likert response 
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The Cronbach Alpha of economic 
redistribution in our sample was 0.85. 
 
Dispositional compassion was measured with the 10-item personality trait of 
dispositional compassion. Items in this scale were selected from Goldberg (1999) by 
Sznycer et al. (2017). Examples include “I sympathize with the homeless” and “I try not 
to think about the needy” (reversed). Each item used a Likert response scale from 1 






































































Dispositional envy was measured with the 8-item Dispositional Envy scale (Smith, 
Parrott, Diener, Hoyle, & Kim, 1999). Example items include: “Feelings of envy 
constantly torment me” and “No matter what I do, envy always plagues me”. The 
dispositional envy scale has no reverse-scored items, and responses were coded from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Cronbach Alpha was 0.87 in our sample. 
 
Self-interest was measured with one item: “Imagine that a policy of higher taxes 
on the wealthy is implemented. What overall impact do you think the higher taxes on 
the wealthy would have on you?”, with responses on a 1 to 5 scale: My own economic 
situation would 1: significantly worsen; slightly worsen; stay the same; slightly 
improve; 5 significantly improve. Aid to the poor was also measured by one question: 
“In the last 12 months, did you give money, food, or other material resources of your 
own to poor people (either directly to them or to charities)?”, coded on 1 (yes) and 0 
(no). 
 
Wealthy-harming preference was using an item asking subject to choose between 
two contrasting scenarios. Scenario one was “The top 1% wealthiest individuals pay an 
extra 50% of their income in additional taxes, and as a consequence of that the poor 
get an additional £100 million per year (the extra 50% in taxes paid in former fiscal 
years leaving the wealthiest with relatively less taxable income)”. The second scenario 
was “The top 1% wealthiest individuals pay an extra 10% of their income in additional 
taxes, and as a consequence of that the poor get an additional £200 million per year 
(the extra 10% in taxes paid in former fiscal years leaving the wealthiest with relatively 
more taxable income)”. Preference for scenario 1 (coded 1) reflects wealth-harming 
preference, increasing tax at even though this generates less money to redistribute. 
Scenario 2 showed a preference for helping the poor (coded on 0). To fit the local 
conditions, the currency in the two scenarios was changed from U.S. dollars ($) to 
Pound sterling (£). 
 
Endorsement of procedural fairness was measured with 7 items developed by 




































































Examples of items: “Every group should be judged with the same yardstick” and “It 
would not bother me much if different groups of people were subject to different rules” 
(reversed). Its Cronbach Alpha was 0.55 in our sample. 
 
Socioeconomic status (SES) was measured with 7 items developed by Sznycer et 
al. (2017). Examples items include: “I grew up in a relatively wealthy neighbourhood” 
and “I will probably be relatively poor later in life.” (reversed). All items coded on 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and a sum score derived following Sznycer et 
al. (2017). Its Cronbach Alpha was 0.79 in our sample. 
 
 Party affiliation was measured with one item, participants were asked to choose 
which political party they support with 6 options: Conservative Party, Labour Party, 
Liberal Democrats, Scottish National Party, United Kingdom Independence Party and 
No party. Following Sznycer et al. (2017) we scored support for the main left party as 
1, versus 0 for all other parties. In our study, the main left party referred to Labour, 




Descriptive statistics for the main variables are shown in Table 2. All predictions 
were tested using regression, with support for redistribution as the dependent variable, 
and compassion, envy, self-interest and fairness as independent variables, controlling 
for age, gender, socioeconomic status and party affiliation. The results are shown in 
Table 3. 
 
Insert Table 2 and Table 3 about here 
 
 
The prediction that compassion would be associated with increased support for 
redistribution (Hypothesis 1) was supported: Compassion showed a significant effect 
(t(194) =5.64, p <.001) in the predicted direction (𝛽 = 0.37, CI95% [0.24, 0.50]). 
Support for hypothesis 2, that higher envy would be associated with support for 




































































small positive effect (𝛽 = 0.06 (CI95% [-0.08, .019]). This effect was not, however, 
significant(t(194) = 0.835, p =.405). 
 
Hypothesis 3, that self-interest would guide support for redistribution was also 
supported, with a significant (t(194) =3.225, p = .001) effect in the predicted direction 
(𝛽 = 0.20, CI95% [0.08, 0.33]). Hypothesis 4, that higher preference for fairness would 
not show significant association with higher support for redistribution, was tested in the 
same regression analysis reported above. As predicted, fairness failed to significantly 
predict support for redistribution (t(194) = 0.031, p =.975; 𝛽= 0.001 CI95% [-0.12, 
0.13]). This result was again robust to different choices of covariates included in the 
regression model (as shown in Table 3, model 2). 
 
We then tested the final three predictions regarding effects of covariate (political 
support) and the association of the compassion and envy variables with charitable 
giving and preference for wealth harming taxation. Hypothesis 5, that left-political 
support would be associated with higher support for redistribution was supported by 
the result of a regression test with support for age, gender and SES as covariates (as 
shown in Table 3, model 4). Party affiliation showed a significant small association 
(β=0.20, 95% CI [0.07, 0.32]), support for the Labour party was positively related with 
support for redistribution of wealth. 
 
Hypothesis 6, that compassion would be positively associated with reported aid to 
the poor was tested using a binary logistic regression predicting giving to the poor with 
the three motivational measures entered as IVs along with support for redistribution 
and controlling for age, gender, and SES. Most (81%) participants reported giving 
material resources to poor people during the previous 12 months. Out of the three 
motivational systems, only compassion significantly predicted differences in self-
reported charitable giving (z = 3.691, p <.001). A unit increase in compassion was 
associated with 17% increased odds of having given aid to the poor in the last year 
(odds ratio = 1.17, CI95% [1.08, 1.27]). 
 
The hypothesis 7, that envy would be associated with wealthy-harming tax choices 




































































predicted direction and of the approximate (small) magnitude reported by Sznycer et al. 
(2017), the association of envy with self-reported desire to harm the wealthy was not 
significant (z = 0.029, p = .977), with an effect size of 0.1% increase in odds (odds ratio 
= 1.001, CI95% [0.91, 1.08]). 
 
Discussion 
Study 1 tested replication of the relationship of compassion, self-interest, and envy 
to support for redistribution. Two major sets of findings emerged. First, the predicted 
significant effects of compassion and self-interest were replicated. In addition, results 
compatible with a predicted null effect of preference for fairness on support for 
redistribution were found. Second, the predicted effect of dispositional envy on support 
for redistribution did not reach significance, nor was an association of dispositional 
envy and wealthy-harming preferences found, despite our replicating the relationship 
of compassion to self-reported charitable giving. The results, then, supported a role for 
motives elicited by the needy-other (compassion) and the actor’s own self-interest in 
shaping support for redistribution but were ambiguous in support for a role of 
dispositional envy. Below, we discuss the result for envy, focussing on the small effect 
size and potential measurement issues with dispositional envy leading to a test of the 
specific effects of malicious envy. 
 
One plausible reason for the lack of significance of dispositional envy in this study 
is the very small predicted effect of dispositional envy, based on Sznycer et al. (2017). 
As seen in Table 1, envy failed to reach significance in one of the 4 samples reported 
by Sznycer et al. (2017). Furthermore, in all countries, the standardized regression 
coefficients for envy were smaller than those for compassion and for self-interest, with 
standardized effect sizes of just 0.06 to 0.08 (Sznycer et al., 2017). Though we did not 
realise it at the time, we were not well powered to observe this effect. The R2 of models 
including only envy as a predictor is expected to be very small – just 0.012 in their UK 
sample, implying sample sizes of at least 649 participants to reach 80% power to detect 
the effect of envy, or 1,072 participants for 95% power to replicate. 
 
While the three motivations and control variables jointly accounted for 26% of the 




































































consistent with Sznycer et al. (2017), in the “very small” range. In this case not only 
will replicating the effect prove expensive, but such a small effect – invisible except in 
samples of many hundreds of subjects – may also cause doubt over the validity of the 
three-motives model: Why would one of just three relevant evolved motives have so 
little effect on the behaviour it is designed to control, especially in a world where inputs 
to this mechanism are presumably vastly larger than in ancestral times? 
 
A second plausible explanation for a small effect of dispositional envy, which we 
explore next, is that a psychological mechanism processing relationships to the better-
off indeed impacts support for redistribution and with a magnitude comparable to that 
of compassion and of self-interest, but that dispositional envy fails to measure the form 
of envy generated by this motive. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a second study, 





































































In Study 2, we set out to select a superior measure of envy, and test if with this 
new measure, effects on support for redistribution could be found reliably and with 
magnitudes comparable to those of self-interest and compassion. Theoretically, the 
mechanism which dealing with better-off others is proposed to have selected for is 
driven by relative position, motivating the envier to harm the better-off thus increasing 
the envier’s relative position. The dispositional envy scale, however, was not designed 
to specifically target negative feelings, and the authors of the scale note that none of 
items directly reflect ill-will (Smith et al., 1999). Current research on envy places ill-
will at the heart of envy (Parrott & Smith, 1993; Smith & Kim, 2007; Smith et al., 1999). 
This insight has led to the distinguishing of two forms of envy: Benign, involving the 
aspirational motive to “move ones-self upward”, and true envy, implementing the 
malicious motive to “pull others down” (Lange & Crusius, 2015). Benign envy is thus 
characterized by a desire to improving one's own position by achieve what others have 
demonstrated can be accomplished – at worst it motivates imitative rather than 
autonomous behaviour. In contrast, malicious envy is characterized by hostility and 
behaviours designed to harm and decrease the positional advantage of better-off others 
(Belk, 2011; Crusius & Lange, 2014; Lange & Crusius, 2015; Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, 
& Pieters, 2009, 2011). 
 
To exploit this more sophisticated model of envy, in study 2, we added scales 
measuring benign and malicious envy. Based on the hypothesis that malicious envy 
would motivate subjects to attempt to harm or reduce the advantage of better-off others, 
we predicted that malicious envy would be associated with higher support for 
redistribution, with an effect comparable to that of self-interest or compassion.  
 
We were less certain of the role of benign envy. On the one hand, it might be 
hypothesised that benign envy would motivate a desire to improve one's own position 
at the cost of the better-off, leading to a weak association with support for redistribution 
and wealth-destroying taxation if this was compatible with self-interest. On the other 
hand, an equally plausible inductive hypothesis might assert that benign envy should 
show no association with desire to transfer resources from the better-off to one’s self, 




































































aversion to policies that make this less possible. On balance, we pre-registered the 
hypothesis that benign envy would also be positively associated with support for 
redistribution. Regarding dispositional envy, we retained the prediction from Sznycer 
et al. (2017), that dispositional envy scores would be positively associated with higher 
support for redistribution. However, we predicted a higher effect size for malicious envy. 
Following the findings of Lange and Crusius (2015) we pre-registered predictions that 
dispositional envy would be significantly correlated with malicious envy, but not with 




A total of 304 UK participants were recruited using Prolific Academic (206 
females, 2 of unknown gender), including 104 who had participated in Study 1. The 
mean age of the participants was 34 years (SD = 12). The sample included participants 
identifying themselves as White (n = 228; 75%), Asian (n = 13; 4.3%), Mixed (n = 7; 
2.3%), Black (n = 3; 1.0%) and other (n = 53; 17.4%). The study procedures were 
approved by the Psychology Research Ethics Committee at the School of Philosophy, 
Psychology & Language Sciences in the University of Edinburgh. All participants gave 
informed consent.  
 
Measures 
Attitudes toward redistribution were measured with the same 11-item support for 
economic redistribution scale used in Study 1 (Cronbach Alpha in our sample 0.89). 
Dispositional Envy (Smith et al., 1999) was measured using the 8-item Scale used in 
Study 1 (Cronbach Alpha 0.90). 
 
Benign and malicious envy were measured with the 10-item Benign and Malicious 
Envy Scale (Lange & Crusius, 2015). An example benign envy item is “Envying others 
motivates me to accomplish my goals” and an example malicious item is “I wish that 
superior people lose their advantage”. Items were scored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
6 (strongly agree), no items are reversed. Cronbach Alpha of the subscales in our 
sample was 0.91 for benign envy and 0.90 for malicious envy. The benign envy items 







































































We hypothesised that higher scores on each of the envy scales would be associated 
with higher support for redistribution, but that malicious envy should show the largest 
effect. Dispositional envy showed a standardized regression coefficient of just 0.02 
(CI95% [-0.11, 0.11]) and was non-significant (t(303) = .33, p =.743). For benign envy 
the effect was small but negative (𝛽 = -0.05 CI95% [-0.17, 0.06]) and also non-
significant (t(303) = -.89, p =.372). Crucially, malicious envy showed the predicted 
relatively strong positive effect (𝛽 = 0.14 CI95% [0.01, 0.27]), significantly predicting 
support for redistribution (t(303) = 2.14, p =.033). This result was robust to different 
choices of covariates included in the regression model or not (as shown in Table 4, 
model 2). Separate analyses of the participants from Study 1 and the participants newly 
recruited for study 2 was in line with prediction. In subjects who also participated in 
study 1, malicious envy showed a significant positive effect on support for 
redistribution (𝛽 = 0.25 CI95% [0.05, 0.46], t(101) = 2.50, p =.014). Among newly-
recruited participants, malicious envy showed the same direction of effect (𝛽 = 0.06 
CI95% [-0.12, 0.24]) but this did not reach significance (t(200) = 0.70, p =.483). 
Estimating modest effects with precision in small samples is unreliable, and in study 3, 
we tested replication of the effect in a large independent sample. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Turning to the three envy measures themselves we found that dispositional envy 
was significantly associated with both malicious envy (r = 0.40, t(302) = 7.54, p <.001) 
and with benign envy (r = 0.15, t(302) = 2.68, p =0.007). The correlation matrix is 
shown in Table 5. 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
Discussion 
We found that malicious (but not dispositional or benign) envy was significantly 




































































hypothesis that it is the specific motive to pull down the better-off that plays an active 
role in predicting support for redistribution and that the Lange and Crusius (2015) 
malicious envy scale is a suitable tool to capture this motivation. 
 
While we had predicted that benign envy may also be associated with support for 
redistribution, this was not supported. It seems benign envy is rather unrelated to 
support for redistribution, consistent with the prediction that benign enviers admire and 
aspire to attain success and are therefore less likely to support policies which make 
success less likely. The results suggest that the absence of hostile content in the 
dispositional envy scale likely accounts for its lack of effect. By failing to target the 
malicious motivation that has proven key to comprehending envy (Smith & Kim, 2007), 
while also confounding aspects of benign envy, dispositional envy only weakly taps the 
dimension of malicious envy and is diluted by variance unrelated to malicious envy, 
thus failing to robustly predict support for redistribution. We interpret this as support 
both for the two-dimensional model of envy, and for the algorithm of the innate 
mechanism for reacting to those better-off involving elements of hostility and ill-will. 
 
Study 2 accomplished its goal of refining the emotional motive of responses to the 
better-off other. A limitation was that we did not include measures of self-interest and 
compassion, and likely had less than a desirable sample size. Therefore, we conducted 
a third study, setting out to replicate the association of malicious envy in the presence 
of the other two motivational systems, including compassion, self-interest and adding 
the malicious and benign envy measures, and using an independent sample with good 






































































 Sznycer et al. (2017) found weaker support for dispositional envy, as compared to 
the effects of compassion and self-interest. Our study 1 supported a very small, non-
significant effect of dispositional envy, but our study 2 suggested that envy is a duplex 
system of largely independent malicious and benign components, and that a specific 
measure of malicious envy has a similar effect on support for redistribution as self-
interest. This supports the three-motives model, refining the measurement underpinning 
it, but stands in need of empirical replication and theoretical consolidation, which we 
set out to accomplish in study 3. 
 
We began from a close replication of Sznycer et al. (2017) in a well-powered 
sample, supplementing the data with measures of benign and malicious envy. Although 
benign envy had no impact on support for redistribution in our Study 2, we retained this 
measure both to test if benign envy may interact with self-interest to magnify support 
for redistribution when in one’s self-interest, or if it is instead an entirely benign “re-
writing” of the ancestral algorithm processing reaction to those who are better-off in 
ways which are not socially harmful.   
  
We tested three main predictions, predicting that higher compassion, higher 
malicious envy and higher self-interest would be associated with higher support for 
redistribution (pre-registration https://aspredicted.org/55u2e.pdf). We also tested the 
interaction of benign envy and self-interest to rule out a logically possible (but 
implausible) association of benign envy with support for redistribution within the 




A total of 501 British participants were recruited using Prolific Academic, with 
373 females and a mean age of 35 years (SD = 12). The sample included participants 
identifying themselves as White (n = 450; 89.8%), Asian (n = 17; 3.4%), Mixed (n = 
15; 3.0%), Black (n = 6; 1.2%), Caribbean (n = 5; 1.0%) and other (n = 8; 1.6%), none 
of subjects previously completed the other studies. The study procedures were approved 




































































& Language Sciences in the University of Edinburgh. All participants gave informed 
consent. 
 
Measures and Procedure 
Scales used were the same as those introduced in studies 1 and 2. Support for 
economic redistribution had a Cronbach Alpha in this sample of 0.88. Dispositional 
compassion had a Cronbach Alpha of 0.77 and the 8-item Smith et al. (1999) 
Dispositional Envy Scale a Cronbach Alpha of 0.87. Self-interest was again measured 
using the single- item used in Study 1. Benign and malicious envy (Lange & Crusius, 
2015) had Cronbach Alphas of 0.89 and 0.88 respectively. SES and party affiliation 
were also measured as in study 1. SES had a Cronbach Alpha of 0.80 in this sample. 
 
Results 
Hypotheses 1 to 3 were tested using regression, with support for redistribution as 
the dependent variable, and compassion, dispositional envy, malicious envy, benign 
envy, and self-interest as the independent variables, controlling for age, gender, 
socioeconomic status and party affiliation. The results are shown in Table 6. 
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
Compassion showed a significant effect (t(501) =10.09, p <.001) in the predicted 
direction (𝛽 = 0.40, CI95% [0.32, 0.48]). Self-interest was also significant (t(501) =5.60, 
p <.001) and had an effect in the predicted direction (𝛽 = 0.21, CI95% [0.13, 0.28]). 
Finally, for malicious envy, the standardized effect size was 0.15 (CI95% [0.06, 0.24]) 
and was significant (t(501) = 3.32, p =.001). As shown in Table 6, when only 
compassion and self-interest were controlled, dispositional envy had a significant but 
small relationship with support for redistribution (𝛽 = 0.11, CI95% [0.03, 0.18], t(501) 
=2.8, p = .005). However, this effect disappeared when controlling malicious envy. 
 
Thus, the effects of compassion, malicious envy and self-interest were all 
supported: Jointly, these three motives accounted for a total of ~1/3rd of variance in 
support for redistribution (see Figure 1). Results were robust to changes in covariates, 




































































affiliation as control variables (Table 6). 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
We also wished to rule-out any role of benign envy in support for redistribution 
through more complex interactions. To do this, we contrasted two multiple regression 
models, each included self-interest, benign envy and one included the interaction of 
these two terms. The variables were standardized and an interaction term between self-
interest and benign envy was created. The interaction was non-significant (𝛽 = -0.01, 
CI95% [-0.09, 0.07], t(497) = -0.14, p = 0.888), and adding it to the model did not 
significantly increase the variance explained (F(1, 497) = 0.02, p= 0.89). 
 
Discussion 
Study 3 strongly supported the predicted effects of compassion, malicious envy 
and self-interest. Studies 1-3 supported replicable and robust effects of self-interest and 
compassion on support for redistribution, a lack of effect of procedural forms of fairness. 
Studies 2 and 3 supported an effect of malicious envy on par with that of self-interest 
in predicting support for redistribution. 
 
The findings have both theoretical and practical implications, highlighting the 
multi-componential nature of support for redistribution with psychological motives 
distributed across multiple systems. In addition, the research highlights the importance 
of specifying the forms of cognitive mechanisms believed to have been sculpted by 
specific selection pressures. In this case, the much stronger link of malicious envy and 
near-zero effect of benign envy suggest that the motive towards the better-off which 
supports destructive redistribution is that specified in the Smith and Kim (2007) model 
of envy: an emotion processing relative position as inferiority and experienced as 
unpleasant, cycling, shame and anger/hostility. As redistribution motivated by 
malicious envy is destructive for both the better-off and the less well-off, research to 
identify causes of, and mitigate negative effects of this motive would appear to be 
valuable, helping people follow the admonition “you shall not covet…anything that is 
your neighbor's” (Exodus 20:17). Benign envy appears to form a basis for such a motive, 





































































These studies suggest that deeper consideration of how evolutionary processes 
lead to the formation of specialized devices is a valuable approach with applications to 
pressing social problems. The three-player two-situation model emerges as a generative 
research framework, suggesting new directions for research, for instance testing if the 
tendency to help the less well-off is conditioned by perceptions of efforts for self-help 
among this group (Petersen, Sznycer, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2012). The possibility of 
explaining additional variance suggests this is a rich field for evolutionary study with, 
perhaps, additional adaptations relevant to solving this task. Testing additional concepts 
of fairness beyond procedural and windfall redistribution e.g. egalitarian (Starmans et 
al., 2017) or mutualistic (Baumard et al., 2013) fairness would be valuable. Including 
influences of general-purpose cognition (Lewis & Bates, 2018) may also increase 
variance accounted for. Controlling factors such as economic knowledge may also be 
useful (Sefton, 2005). Links to economic theory also appear to be attractive directions 
for future development, developing predictions for policies which might reduce harms 
driven by positional status motives of the envious, with their externalities of social costs 
in both total wealth and the well-being of others whether better-off or less well-off. 
 
To conclude, the present studies support the application of evolutionary 
approaches to redistribution, and the specific model of support for redistribution as 
activating three mechanisms processing three group relations and their associated 
motives. The work refines the specific cognitive implementation of envy linked to 
redistribution, supporting role of malicious envy processing positional status and 
motivating harm of the better-off even at the cost of the less well-off or even the self. 
The work also supported a possible alternative evolved response to the better-off, one 
which is benign in nature, and leading to admiration or self-improvement, but which 
does not motivate malice to the better-off, even when this is in-line with self-interest.  
 







































































Aktipis, A., De Aguiar, R., Flaherty, A., Iyer, P., Sonkoi, D., & Cronk, L. (2016). 
Cooperation in an uncertain world: For the Maasai of East Africa, need-based 
transfers outperform account-keeping in volatile environments. Human Ecology, 
44(3), 353-364.  
Barrett-Howard, E., & Tyler, T. R. (1986). Procedural justice as a criterion in allocation 
decisions. Journal of personality and social psychology, 50(2), 296-304.  
Baumard, N., André, J.-B., & Sperber, D. (2013). A mutualistic approach to morality: 
The evolution of fairness by partner choice. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
36(1), 59-78.  
Belk, R. (2011). Benign envy. AMS review, 1(3-4), 117-134.  
Brosnan, S. F., & de Waal, F. B. (2014). Evolution of responses to (un) fairness. Science, 
346(6207), 1-7. doi:10.1126/science.1251776 
Cashdan, E. A. (1985). Coping with risk: Reciprocity among the Basarwa of Northern 
Botswana. Man, 454-474.  
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002). Understanding social preferences with simple tests. 
The quarterly journal of economics, 117(3), 817-869.  
Crusius, J., & Lange, J. (2014). What catches the envious eye? Attentional biases within 
malicious and benign envy. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 55, 1-
11.  
Engelmann, D., & Strobel, M. (2004). Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin 
preferences in simple distribution experiments. American Economic Review, 
94(4), 857-869.  
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. 
The quarterly journal of economics, 114(3), 817-868.  
Goldberg, L. R. (1999). A broad-bandwidth, public domain, personality inventory 
measuring the lower-level facets of several five-factor models. Personality 
psychology in Europe, 7(1), 7-28.  
Greenberg, J. (1987). Reactions to procedural injustice in payment distributions: Do the 
means justify the ends? Journal of Applied Psychology, 72(1), 55-61.  
Halpern, D. (2001). Moral values, social trust and inequality: can values explain crime? 
British Journal of Criminology, 41(2), 236-251.  
Jaeggi, A. V., & Gurven, M. (2013). Natural cooperators: food sharing in humans and 
other primates. Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews, 22(4), 
186-195.  
Kameda, T., Takezawa, M., Tindale, R. S., & Smith, C. M. (2002). Social sharing and 
risk reduction: Exploring a computational algorithm for the psychology of 




































































Kangas, O. E. (1997). Self-interest and the common good: the impact of norms, 
selfishness and context in social policy opinions. The Journal of Socio-
Economics, 26(5), 475-494.  
Kaplan, H., Gurven, M., Hill, K., & Hurtado, A. M. (2005). The natural history of 
human food sharing and cooperation: a review and a new multi-individual 
approach to the negotiation of norms. Moral sentiments and material interests: 
The foundations of cooperation in economic life, 6, 75-113.  
Kaplan, H., Hill, K., Cadelina, R. V., Hayden, B., Hyndman, D. C., Preston, R. J., . . . 
Yesner, D. R. (1985). Food sharing among ache foragers: Tests of explanatory 
hypotheses [and comments and reply]. Current Anthropology, 26(2), 223-246.  
Klor, E. F., & Shayo, M. (2010). Social identity and preferences over redistribution. 
Journal of Public economics, 94(3-4), 269-278.  
Kurzban, R., Burton-Chellew, M. N., & West, S. A. (2015). The evolution of altruism 
in humans. Annual review of psychology, 66, 575-599.  
Lange, J., & Crusius, J. (2015). Dispositional envy revisited: Unraveling the 
motivational dynamics of benign and malicious envy. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 41(2), 284-294. doi:10.1177/0146167214564959 
Lewis, G. J., & Bates, T. C. (2011). From left to right: How the personality system 
allows basic traits to influence politics via characteristic moral adaptations. 
British Journal of Psychology, 102(3), 546-558.  
Lewis, G. J., & Bates, T. C. (2018). Higher levels of childhood intelligence predict 
increased support for economic conservatism in adulthood. Intelligence, 70, 36-
41.  
Linos, K., & West, M. (2003). Self‐ interest, social beliefs, and attitudes to 
redistribution. Re‐ addressing the issue of cross‐ national variation. European 
Sociological Review, 19(4), 393-409.  
McCaffery, E. J., & Baron, J. (2004). The political psychology of redistribution. UCLA 
L. Rev., 52, 1745-1792.  
Neumayer, E. (2004). The environment, left-wing political orientation and ecological 
economics. Ecological economics, 51(3-4), 167-175.  
Parrott, W. G., & Smith, R. H. (1993). Distinguishing the experiences of envy and 
jealousy. Journal of personality and social psychology, 64(6), 906-920. 
doi:10.1037//0022-3514.64.6.906 
Pedersen, E. J., Kurzban, R., & McCullough, M. E. (2013). Do humans really punish 
altruistically? A closer look. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences, 280(1758), 20122723.  
Petersen, M. B., Sznycer, D., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2012). Who deserves help? 




































































Political psychology, 33(3), 395-418.  
Petersen, M. B., Sznycer, D., Sell, A., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2013). The ancestral 
logic of politics: Upper-body strength regulates men’s assertion of self-interest 
over economic redistribution. Psychological science, 24(7), 1098-1103.  
Sears, D. O., Lau, R. R., Tyler, T. R., & Allen, H. M. (1980). Self-interest vs. symbolic 
politics in policy attitudes and presidential voting. American Political Science 
Review, 74(3), 670-684.  
Sefton, T. (2005). Give and take: attitudes to redistribution. British Social Attitudes, 22, 
1-32.  
Smith, R. H., & Kim, S. H. (2007). Comprehending envy. Psychological bulletin, 
133(1), 46-64. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.133.1.46 
Smith, R. H., Parrott, W. G., Diener, E. F., Hoyle, R. H., & Kim, S. H. (1999). 
Dispositional envy. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25(8), 1007-
1020.  
Smith, R. H., Turner, T. J., Garonzik, R., Leach, C. W., Urch-Druskat, V., & Weston, C. 
M. (1996). Envy and schadenfreude. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 22(2), 158-168.  
Starmans, C., Sheskin, M., & Bloom, P. (2017). Why people prefer unequal societies. 
Nature human behaviour, 1(4). doi:10.1038/s41562-017-0082 
Sznycer, D., Seal, M. F. L., Sell, A., Lim, J., Porat, R., Shalvi, S., . . . Tooby, J. (2017). 
Support for redistribution is shaped by compassion, envy, and self-interest, but 
not a taste for fairness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
114(31), 8420-8425.  
Thibaut, J., Walker, L., LaTour, S., & Houlden, P. (1973). Procedural justice as fairness. 
Stan. L. Rev., 26, 1271-1289.  
Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1996). Friendship and the banker's paradox: Other pathways 
to the evolution of adaptations for altruism. Proceedings-British Academy, 88, 
119-144.  
Van de Ven, N., Zeelenberg, M., & Pieters, R. (2009). Leveling up and down: the 
experiences of benign and malicious envy. Emotion, 9(3), 419-429. 
doi:10.1037/a0015669 
Van de Ven, N., Zeelenberg, M., & Pieters, R. (2011). Why envy outperforms 
admiration. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37(6), 784-795. 
doi:10.1177/0146167211400421 
Weeden, J., & Kurzban, R. (2016). The hidden agenda of the political mind: How self-
interest shapes our opinions and why we won't admit it: Princeton University 
Press. 








































































































































Table 1. Regression models predicting support for redistribution in Sznycer et al. (2017)  








Compassion .39 [.33 .44] *** .25 [ .16 .33] *** .37 [.31 .44] *** .29 [.19 .41] *** 
Envy .14 [.08 .19] *** .08 [-.00 .16] .10 [.03 .17]** .12 [.01 .23] * 
Self-interest .30 [.24 .35] *** .30 [ .22 .37] *** .21 [.14 .28] *** .18 [.06 .28] * 
R2 .28 .15 .22 .13 
N 1032 560 646 282 
Note. Effects are standardized regression coefficients [followed by 95% CI]. 







































































Table 2. Descriptive statistics of main variables in present Study 1 (UK sample) with Sznycer (2017) US study values for comparison. 
Variable Replication Sznycer et al. (2017) 
Redistribution 3.26 (0.69) 3.14 (0.83) 
Compassion  3.70 (0.56) 3.42 (0.52) 
Envy 2.44 (0.76) 2.30 (0.93) 
Self-interest 3.05 (0.60) 3.22 (0.76) 
SES 2.90 (0.74) 2.94 (0.74) 
% Aid to the poor
α
 81.1% 74.4% 
% Wealthy-harming preference
β
 12.5% 13.7% 
Note. Displayed are means with standard deviations in parentheses, or percentages (two bottom rows).
α
Percentage of subjects who gave money, 
food, or other material resources of their own to poor people in the last 12 months. 
β
Percentage of subjects preferring the “wealthiest pay more 







































































Table 3. Regression models predicting participants’ support for redistribution 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Compassion .40 [.28 .52] *** .40 [.27 .52] ***  .41 [.28 .54] *** .37 [.24 .50] *** 
Envy .08 [-.05 .20] .08 [-.05 .20]  .04 [-.1 .18] .06 [-.08 .19] 
Self-interest  .22 [.10 .35] *** .22 [.09 .34] ***  .20 [.07 .32] ** .20 [.08 .33] ** 
Fairness  .03 [-.10 .15] -.002 [-.13 .13] .001 [-.12 .13] 
Age   -.13 [-.26 .01] -.08 [-.22 .05] 
Female   -.15 [-.28 -.02] * -.17 [-.29 -.04]** 
SES   -.07 [-.20 .07] -.06 [-.19 .08] 
Party     .20 [.07 .32] ** 
R2 .219 .211 .230 .262 
N 205 205 194 194 
Note. Effects are standardized regression coefficients [followed by 95% CI]. SES: Socio-economic status. Party: 1 = participant most identified 







































































Table 4. Regression models predicting participants’ support for redistribution 








Dispositional Envy .06 [-.14 .26] .05 [-.13 .23] .02 [-.11 .11] .02 [-.11, .11] 
Benign  .03 [-.17 .24] -.09 [-.25 .06] -.05 [-.17 .06] -.06 [-.18 .06] 
Malicious  .25 [.05 .46] * .06 [-.12 .24] .14 [.01 .27] * .13 [.00, .26] * 
Age -.14 [-.34 .06] -.06 [-.21 .09]  -.08 [-.19 .04] 
Female -.09 [-.29 .10] -.05 [-.19 .10]  -.06 [-.17 .05] 
R2 .063 -.008 .010 .012 
N 101 200 304 301 






































































Table 5. The correlation between dispositional envy, benign envy and malicious envy 
 Benign Envy Malicious Envy 
Dispositional Envy .15 [.04 .26] ** .40 [.30 .49] *** 
Benign Envy  .30 [.20 .40] *** 
Note. Effects are correlation coefficients [followed by 95% CI]. 






































































Table 6. Study 3 Regression models predicting support for redistribution 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Compassion .43 [.35 .50] *** .47 [.39 .54] *** .46 [.39 .54] *** .48 [.40 .56] ***  .40 [.32 .48] *** 
Dispositional Envy .11 [.03 .18] **  .04 [-.05 .14] .05 [-.05 .14] -.01 [-.10 .09] 
Self-interest  .24 [.16 .32] *** .24 [.17 .32] *** .23 [.16 .31] *** .24 [.16 .31] ***  .21 [.13 .28] *** 
Malicious Envy  .17 [.09 .25] *** .16 [.07 .25] *** .15 [.06 .24] **  .15 [.06 .24] *** 
Benign Envy   -.07 [-.15 .01] -.06 [-.15 .02] -.04 [-.12 .04] 
Age    -.01 [-.09 .07]  .00 [-.08 .08] 
Female    -.10 [-.17 -.02] * -.09 [-.16 -.02] * 
SES     -.14 [-.21 -.06] *** 
Party      .23 [.16 .31] *** 
R2 .280 .297 .297 .304 .368 
N 501 501 501 501 501 
Note. Effects are standardized regression coefficients [followed by 95% CI]. SES: Socio-economic status. Party: 1 = participant most 








































































Figure 1: Final model, study 3, showing predicted and actual support for 





































































































Figure 1: Final model, study 3, showing predicted and actual support for 
redistribution based on adaptations for compassion, and self-interest, and malicious 
envy. 
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